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CASE COMMENTS

The significance of the principal case in regard to West Virginia
property law is not one of minor potentialities. Interpretations by the
lawyers and courts of our state concerning the ramifications of this
case could have a profound effect upon the nature of future interests,
and particularly contingent remainders. Upon a consideration of
such interpretative possibilities, one tends to search for a concurring
or dissenting opinion which is conspicuously absent.
F. RichardHall

Income Tax-The Deductibility of Meals as Traveling Expenses
The United States Supreme Court in the recent case of United
States v. Correll' ostensibly settled the long standing confusion as to
the permissible scope of section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.
That section provides that a taxpayer may deduct the ordinary and
necessary traveling expenses he incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on his trade or business. Included in this deduction is the
entire amount spent for meals and lodging while away from home.2
The Court elected to examine, in the light of the existing conflicts
among the United States Courts of Appeals,3 the Commissioner's
interpretation of section 162. Specifically, the question presented was
whether the Commissioner's position on that part of section 162
which provides for the deductibility of meals "while away from home"
was justified. Originally the Commissioner ruled that a taxpayer
could not deduct expenses for meals under section 162 unless such
expenses were incident to travel away from home "overnight." 4
Subsequently this overnight requirement was modified by the Commissioner's acquiescence to the decision of the Fifth Circuit in
Williams v. Patterson.6 In that case the taxpayer did not stay away
from home overnight but rather rented a hotel room where he simply
rested prior to returning to work. As a result of the Williams decision
1 20 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d Para. 675845 (1967).
INT. BEv. CODE of 1954, § 162 (a)2.
3 The First Circuit in Comm'r v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir.
1967), upheld the Commissioner's interpretation that the taxpayer's meals
were not deductible under section 162 unless his business travel was such
that he was required to stop for rest or sleep. Contra, Hanson v. Comm'r,
298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
4 Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949); Allan L. Hanson, 35 T.C. 413,
rev'd, Hanson v. Commr, 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
5 Rev. Rul. 221, 1961-2 Cum. BuLL. 34.
6 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
2
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and the Commissioner's subsequent acquiescence, the overnight rule
became known as the "necessary sleep or rest" rule! Even though
Williams v. Patterson was not considered a repudiation of the Commissioner's original overnight rule, it nonetheless marked the beginning of a considerably broader attack on the rule.' But, the Commissioner stood firm and it was this interpretation of section 162 that
was the issue before the Court in the Correll case.
Correll, the taxpayer, was a traveling salesman for a wholesale
grocery with headquarters in Morristown, Tennessee. He lived in
Fountain City, Tennessee, some 50 miles from Morristown. Daily
he left his home at 5 a.m. and stopped to eat his breakfast at the first
point on his route as required by his employer. After the first stop,
Correll continued his route until about 2 p.m. when he again had a
meal at a customer's restaurant. He generally finished his daily
schedule by 4 p.m. Since Correll's daily route required neither sleep
nor rest, the Commissioner disallowed the deduction Correll had
claimed for the cost of his morning and noon meals as traveling
expenses resulting from the pursuit of his business while away from
home under section 162. Rather, the Commissioner considered
such expenses as coming within the provisions of section 262 relating
to the non-deductibility of personal living expenses.' After having
paid the taxes, Correll sued for a refund in the District Court and
received a favorable jury verdict. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the Commissioner's sleep or rest rule is not
"a valid regulation under the present statute."'" Held, reversed. The
Commissioner's sleep or rest rule is at least a reasonable interpretaComm'r v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
Id. at 205.
For a more detailed discussion of those cases resulting from the problems
7

8

surrounding the applicability of the Commissioner's required sleep or rest rule
see 69 W. VA. L. REv. 365 (1967).

9 "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction
shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses." INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 262.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a)2, otherwise expressly provides that,
"There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, induding . ..

(2) traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals
and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business ....
It is the interaction of sections 162 and 262 that becomes the focal point
of cases dealing with the deductibility of meal expenses. Unless these expenses
come within the purview of section 162, section 262 disallows such expenses
as being purely personal in nature.
10 369 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1966).
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tion of section 162, considering the administrative ease of such a rule
and its equalizing effect in application.
The Court found that the pertinent language of section 162 is
sufficiently broad to encompass the Commissioner's interpretation
that "away from home" means away from home "requiring sleep or
rest." The basis for this finding by the Court was its examination
of the relationship of expenses deductible for meals and those deductible for lodging. More particularly, since meals and lodging are used
in the conjunctive in section 162, the Court stated that, at least arguably, "Congress contemplated a deduction for the cost of meals only
when the travel in question involved lodging as well."" There exists
however just as strong an argument to support the proposition that
the mere addition of a conjunction between the words, meals and
lodging, does not indicate that Congress intended that meals and
lodging be construed as a unit. Section 62 which defines adjusted
gross income in general terms describes the deductions under section
162 as consisting of "expenses of travel, meals, and lodging ... .
Therefore, section 62 clearly shows that Congress intended that
meals be considered a separate entity. Nonetheless, it has been
pointed out that the phraseology of section 62 was not intended to
alter the previous meaning of section 162.'" The Court in the Correll
case further pointed out that the word "traveling" as employed in
section 162 imparts the meaning that the taxpayer could only
deduct the enumerated expenses when separated from his home.
Accordingly, the majority opinion argued that this phrase "away from
home" is not meant to apply in its literal sense; a literal construction
would render this phrase redundant since the word "traveling"
already implies geographical separation from the taxpayer's home."
Even though the Commissioner's interpretation could thus be
considered a reasonable construction of section 162, the Court
proceeded also to examine whether such construction served to provide a degree of certainty in administration. Therefore, implicit in
the Court's decision is the desire for achieving an unambiguous test
for determining when a taxpayer is away from home, as required
in section 162. The Court adopted the Commissioner's interpretation
I United States v. Correll, 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d Para. 675845, 5848

(1967).
12 I'Nr. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 62(2)(B).

,3 Comm'r v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204 N. 10 (1st Cir. 1967).
14 United States v. Correll, 20 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d Para. 675845 N. 16
(1967).
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that a taxpayer is away from home only "if his trip requires him to
stop for sleep or rest." The majority reasoned that this limited test
achieves the necessary concreteness by adequately limiting the
statutory phrase "away from home."' 5 But, by accepting this test the
Court created a new, albeit less obvious, ambiguity. That is, since
a taxpayer's meals are only deductible in those situations where his
travel requires him to stop for sleep or rest, one must of necessity
ascertain when sleep or rest is required. Whether or not one will in
fact require sleep or rest is clearly dependent on a variety of factors.
Should the taxpayer, under this test, consider the length of the trip
in determining whether sleep or rest is required, or is simply the
time factor sufficient? Additionally, does the taxpayer consider his
particular physical and emotional need for rest or sleep? The Court
would seem to say not. The majority pointed out that the Commissioner has consistently excluded such factors as time and distance.' 6
The taxpayer might also ask if he must in fact stop for rest or sleep,
or is the fact that such sleep is required sufficient to bring him
within the meaning of the required sleep or rest rule? It appears
the majority has adopted a test which may be as ambiguous as the
statutory language it was seeking to define. Certainly the taxpayer
must still take "pot luck" in the courts in order to determine whether
or not his sleep or rest was required.
As orginally conceived, meal expenses incident to business travel
were deductible only when such expenses were in excess of normal
living exepenses." Yet, having tried such a plan and having experienced the related administrative difficulties, the Treasury itself
asked Congress to allow the entire amount expended for meals to
be deductible.' 8 It is incontestable then that the traveler who brings
himself within the purview of section 162 receives somewhat of
a windfall in that at least some personal expenses are deductible.
Admittedly, the traveling taxpayer may incur greater expense in
obtaining meals away from home, but such expense is only that
amount in excess of his normal personal costs for food. Nonetheless,
since the administration of the original excess expense plan proved
totally impractical, the Commissioner was faced with a difficult
situation for he had to achieve some fairness in applying section 162
so that most taxpayers were on an equal tax footing. Perhaps then
Is Id. at 5846 (emphasis added).

Id. at 5847.
Treas. Reg. art. 292 (1920).
18 Comm'r v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1967).
16
'7
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it was this attempt to treat the commuter and the one day traveler
equally that lead to his adoption of the "overnight" or "sleep or
rest" rule. 9 Thus, the Court in the principal case was called upon
not only to examine the administrative ease and certainty of the
"sleep or rest" rule, but also to consider whether the Commissioner's
interpretation of section 162 achieved the desired fairness in application. The Court concluded that it did.
Admittedly, the Commissioner's "sleep or rest" rule is successful
in reducing the inequities among one day travelers. Under this rule
the commuter and the person whose business takes him from New
York to Washington and back the same day are placed upon an
equal tax footing; both are denied the benefit of section 162. But this
rule cannot put the commuter on an equal tax footing with the
traveler who is required to stop for sleep or rest. That is, since
administrative exigencies have shown it necessary to allow the entire
amount spent for meals to be deductible, the moment the taxpayer
comes within the Commissioner's interpretation of section 162 he
receives a partial windfall in that he can deduct some expenses of
a purely personal nature. This is especially true since the Commissioner's rule allows the taxpayer to deduct not only expenses for
meals after lodging but also expenses incurred before such rest or
sleep.
The question now is whether the Commissioner's rule as adopted
by the Court has gone as far as is pragmatically possible to meet the
objective of fairness. Seemingly, a refinement of the Commissioner's
rule could have gone further to diminish the inevitable inequalities
between one day travelers and those who are required to stop for
rest or sleep. More specifically, the Court held a person is not away
from home within the meaning of section 162 until he requires
rest or sleep. Therefore, one might argue that only the expenses for
meals occurring after the taxpayer has stopped for rest or sleep should
be deductible under section 162. For, it is not until the taxpayer has
stopped that he is considered away from home; and, the language
of section 162 is not applicable until the taxpayer is away from home.
This interpretation would reduce the overnight travelers' windfall by
one day's expenses for meals and thereby more closely approximate
the desired equality for all taxpayers. This particular question was
not presented to the Court for determination. Considering however
19 Id. at 207.
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the Court's total acceptance of the Commissioner's interpretation,
this question might well arise in the future. If this problem is resolved and the word "requiring" is deleted from the Commissioner's
interpretation, the meaning of the phrase "away from home" would
become more equitable in application and more definite in meaning.
Thomas Ryan Goodwin

Labor Law-Public Employee's Right to Strike
P, a municipal board of education, obtained a temporary injunction restraining Ds, a public school teachers union and its president,
from engaging in a strike. By statute, all public employees and employee organizations were prohibited from striking. Ds ignored the
injunction which was made final shortly afterward. Criminal contempt charges were then brought against Ds for violation of the
injunction. Ds urged that its members were not striking, but that
they had instead "resigned." Held, guilty of contempt. It has long
been a fundamental principle that a government employee may not
strike. This common law phobition is now reflected in statutory
form. Ds in asserting that a strike is not the same as the so-called
"resignations" are urging a distinction without a difference; the
argument is specious and sham. By engaging in a strike, Ds deliberately violated the statute and defied the lawful mandate of the court.
Board of Education v. Shanker, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1967).

The principal case is simply one more addition to the long line of
authority which denies public employees the right to strike. As
stated in the case, "From time immemorial, it has been a fundamental
principle that a government employee may not strike."' This broad
prohibition has been applied with equal vigor to federal, state, and
municipal employees. By statute, federal employees are not only
denied the right to strike, but they are also prohibited from knowingly
becoming members of an organization that asserts the right to strike
against the government. 2 Likewise, several states have codified
the proscription against strikes by public employees' and the states
Bd. of Educ. v. Shanker, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 548 (1967).
2

5 U.S.C. §§ 118p-r (1964).

3 Currently, statutory provisions against strikes by public employees are

found in Fla., Hawaii, Mich., Minn., Neb., N.Y., Ohio, Pa., Tex., and Va.
Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 12 LAB. L.J. 1069, 1071

(1961).
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